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Investigating the Third Dimension for Authentication in Immersive Virtual












Figure 1: We study how the third dimension can be leveraged to improve the usability and security of authentication. (A) shows
the sample real world room used for the study. (B) is a replica of the real world room. This screenshot depicts a view of the virtual
scene from the view-point of the user during authentication process. When more than one object is selected, a blue connecting line
appears. (C) is the view from the real world during user authentication in the virtual scene with a HMD, namely the HTC Vive [22].
ABSTRACT
Immersive Virtual Reality (IVR) is a growing 3D environment,
where social and commercial applications will require user authen-
tication. Similarly, smart homes in the real world (RW), offer an
opportunity to authenticate in the third dimension. For both environ-
ments, there is a gap in understanding which elements of the third
dimension can be leveraged to improve usability and security of
authentication. In particular, investigating transferability of findings
between these environments would help towards understanding how
rapid prototyping of authentication concepts can be achieved in this
context.
We identify key elements from prior research that are promising
for authentication in the third dimension. Based on these, we propose
a concept in which users’ authenticate by selecting a series of 3D
objects in a room using a pointer. We created a virtual 3D replica of
a real world room, which we leverage to evaluate and compare the
factors that impact the usability and security of authentication in IVR
and RW. In particular, we investigate the influence of randomized
user and object positions, in a series of user studies (N=48). We
also evaluate shoulder surfing by real world bystanders for IVR
(N=75). Our results show that 3D passwords within our concept are
resistant against shoulder surfing attacks. Interactions are faster in
RW compared to IVR, yet workload is comparable.
Index Terms: Human-centered computing—User studies—;
Human-centered computing—Virtual reality—
1 INTRODUCTION
Head mounted displays (HMD) allow users to experience immersive





time using HMDs, storing personal data on the devices (e.g., credit
card credentials), and using them for social interactions, the need
for seamless authentication in IVR becomes increasingly important.
Our vision for seamless authentication entails entering passwords
when needed during the IVR interaction, such as upon buying a
shopping item. This stands in contrast to all-in-one solutions, such
as entering a password before using the HMD, as previous research
has found the latter to be a poor fit for users’ preferences [14]. This
is especially the case when considering (1) the wireless future of
HMDs as self-contained devices with no additional input hardware,
such as a keyboard and external monitor, for example the Oculus
Go [24], and (2) that taking the headset off leads to a break of
immersion and presence, which would diminish one of the greatest
strengths of this technology.
Similarly, smart homes in the real world (RW), provide an immer-
sive environment, where users can authenticate in 3D. For example,
consider a person entering a room and enabling all ubiquitous tech-
nologies within that room/house by selecting a number of tracked or
digital objects. We regard this as the next step towards embedding
authentication into our natural environment.
Contrary to prior work, which focused on transferring 2D con-
cepts (e.g. PIN) to IVR [10] and smart homes in the RW [15], we
investigate the third dimension for authentication with two research
questions:
R1 How can the usage of special properties offered by the 3D
environment improve usability and security of authentication?
The 3D environment provides an opportunity to increase usability,
by making the authentication concept part of the immersive world,
and to improve security, by utilizing virtual 3D objects as passwords,
which makes it more difficult for a real world bystander to observe
them. Thus, we see a clear need to investigate the third dimension
for authentication.
R2 Can the concept of using 3D objects for authentication be
transferred from VR to a real world setting, for example for smart
homes?
Understanding the transferability of findings between these environ-
ments could help with realizing rapid prototyping of future authenti-
cation concepts.
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For example, if a researcher wants to evaluate authentication via
mid-air gestures in a smart home, they would have to prototype a
smart home environment in their lab. Prototyping this setup is not
only costly, but also fundamentally limited in creating the conditions
necessary to understand all aspects that influence the usability and
security of authentication schemes. On the other hand, by using
IVR for high-level prototyping, researchers can experiment with
conditions that are infeasible to replicate in the real world e.g.,
evaluating observation resistance from all possible angles.
These reasons underline the need to investigate how interaction
in the virtual 3D environment differs compared to that of a real
environment.
To this end, we first propose novel interaction concepts for au-
thentication in the third dimension by applying findings from prior
work to IVR. To test these concepts in the real world and IVR, we
created a virtual 3D replica of a real world room. We evaluated and
compared these concepts in a series of user studies based on their
usability (n= 48) and memorability1 (n= 27) in both environments.
We also investigate observation resistance (immediate observation
attacks n= 15, post-hoc observation attacks n= 36) for IVR.
Our analyses show that leveraging the third dimension for au-
thentication in IVR increases resistance against observation attacks.
While interactions took significantly longer in the virtual world
compared to the real world, we found no differences in workload,
which implies that users’ perception of difficulty is not influenced
by the environment, whereas their performance is. Our findings are
valuable for researchers and practitioners who design authentication
concepts for virtual reality and for the real world.
To summarize, we investigate (R1) how using the third dimension
that IVRs offer can be leveraged when designing interactions for
authentication purposes and (R2) whether the concept to authenticate
with 3D objects can be transferred to real world settings.
2 RELATED WORK
We build on: 1) Authentication Concepts that can be suitable for
IVR, and 2) IVR features that are relevant to authentication.
2.1 Authentication Concepts that are Promising for IVR
Virtual reality environments and the usage of HMDs provide dis-
tinctive features (e.g., limitless space for 3D interaction) that have
not been investigated before in the context of authentication. In this
section we focus on a) authentication concepts that are promising to
apply in virtual reality, and b) features of IVR that can be leveraged
to improve authentication.
2.1.1 Knowledge-based Authentication
Knowledge-based authentication is based on something the user
“knows”, and can be classified into recall-based and recognition-
based authentication [26]. These authentication concepts present a
promising solution for authentication in virtual reality: In the real
world, observation by attackers (“shoulder surfing”) has been identi-
fied as one of the main drawbacks of such methods [3,8]. In contrast,
IVR offers a ‘secret channel between the user and the system’ [10]
that is not visible to attackers in the real world. This channel thus
seems ideal for password cues that are only visible to the user. We
leverage this advantage to improve resistance to shoulder surfing in
IVR, to improve over previous work on authentication using PINs
and patterns in IVR by George et. al [10].
Yadav et. al [34] explored knowledge based systems (e.g. PIN) in
AR systems which were perceived to be usable but entry times were
high (8s-14s on Google Glass). In contrast to AR, where for example
attackers obtain visual cues from glass reflections, the combination
of non-observable visual cues and mid-air interactions has not been
explored in prior research to our knowledge.
1Memorability refers to how well users can memorize passwords [26]
A B
Figure 2: Adapted from Mine et al. [20], interaction in IVR can be
performed in two different ways: Controllers can act as as a virtual
pointer (A), whereby a laser beam is projected into the virtual scene,
and as virtual hands (B), imitating touch interaction. Previous work
revealed pointer interaction to be preferable for authentication [10].
Another way to overwhelm observers when authenticating via
knowledge-based schemes is to randomize the input cues. This was
leveraged in some previous systems such as PassFace [5], V-Go [17]
and keyboard scrambling [32]. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to report on an authentication randomization scheme for 3D
environments.
2.1.2 Biometric Authentication
Android and iOS require setting a fall back knowledge-based au-
thentication method (e.g., PIN or pattern) when using biometric
authentication such as Touch ID or Face ID. This is due to the lim-
itations of biometric authentication in terms of not being feasible
all the time e.g., improper lighting conditions for face detection
or wet/greasy fingers that distort the fingerprint [11]. Moreover,
not all users want to share biometric data with third parties [23],
especially after it has been shown multiple times that they can be
remotely stolen from companies [29]. Hence, although biometric
authentication concepts are a valid alternative for authentication in
IVR and RW, this paper focuses on knowledge-based solutions that
will continue to exist despite the popularity of biometric ones.
2.2 Features of IVR that are Relevant to Authentication
Many features of IVR, such as high memorability, plethora of input
and design possibilities, immersion and presence, can be leveraged
for designing usable and secure authentication schemes.
2.2.1 Memorability in Virtual Reality
Taiabul et al. [12] tested two memory techniques in virtual environ-
ments: the method of loci and the link method. Both leverage spatial
memory which supports humans in recording their surroundings,
forming spatial orientation and awareness [4, 19, 21]. In contrast to
prior work, we empower the user to apply the method of loci in an
immersive 3D environment, where users’ are placed in the center of
the room and surrounded by (virtual and real) 3D objects.
2.2.2 Input and Output Features
HMD controllers offer a vast amount of interaction modalities. Sev-
eral buttons and a touchpad may be used on the hardware itself.
They may be programmed to act as virtual hands, imitating touch
interaction, and as a virtual pointer, projecting a “laser beam” into
the virtual scene (Fig. 2) [20]. Previous work revealed pointer inter-
action to be preferable for authentication [10], which is the method
of choice for our test environment.
The options to display visual elements and cues are limitless in
IVR. Feedback can be displayed within the virtual scene in any
size and shape. It was found that authentication by selecting targets
that are at a far distance is easier than when targets are close by
[10]. Attention should be paid to the amount of information being
displayed in order to not negatively affect cognitive load.
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Table 1: Comparison of post-hoc vs. intermediate attack for the security studies.
Post-hoc vs. Immediate Threat Model
Post-hoc Attack Immediate Attack
Attack mode Video Attack Live Attack
Video of victim authenticating Access to VR device and software
Tools
Pen and paper Pen and paper
1. View video of RW authentication 1. Interact with RoomLock in VR
2. View video of VR authentication 2. Observe user live in-situAttack model
3. Guess password on pen and paper 3. Guess password on pen and paper
Attack opportunity Unlimited view of authentication videos View authentication three times
2.2.3 Immersion and Presence in Virtual Reality
Experiences in virtual reality aim to imitate interactions in the real
world, which is also reflected in the way these environments are eval-
uated. Immersion and Presence are two of the key terms used when
describing how well a virtual environment is perceived by users.
This paper follows Slater et al. [25, 28]: immersion is quantified by
quality of the technology, and presence is the users’ subjective per-
ception of how real the virtual world is compared to the real world.
We consider these aspects in several ways: First, high-end HMDs
(e.g., HTC Vive [22]) establish a high level of immersion in our
studies. As we established earlier, this can serve as an advantage, as
it provides a secret channel between the user and the system. How-
ever, based on prior work, which established that users’ generally
do not notice when being shoulder surfed [8], being immersed may
further increase users unawareness of attackers. Second, presence is
measured to understand how well the virtual world is perceived [2].
Finally, we study the interactions both in IVR and the real world.
Based on Legge et al. [18], this allows us to gain a deeper under-
standing of how spatial memory, awareness and interaction in these
two environments relate to each other. Furthermore, we argue that
findings from both worlds are necessary to understand whether vir-
tual environments can serve as a testbed for usable security research
in the real world, specifically for rapid prototyping purposes.
2.3 Threat Model
We illustrate the addressed threat models with two scenarios,
whereby both start with the victim using their self-contained HMD,
for example the Oculus Go [24], at home while friends and acquain-
tances are close-by. A possible scenario where the user needs to
authenticate is when, for example, confirming a purchase made in a
virtual store or an in-game purchase, or verifying the user’s identity
when logging into a virtual social network or a player’s account.
2.3.1 Post-hoc Attack
The user cannot see the real world, hence they do not notice that a
bystanders (the attacker) is recording the user as they authenticate.
The recording covers the whole room in the RW, including the
authentication process. The attacker watches the recordings later
to recreate the password. Once the password is found, the attacker
could use the observed password to make in-app purchases by, for
Trigger
TrackpadCA B
Figure 3: (A) displays the view of the HTC Vive controller [22] in the
real world, whereas (B) shows how the controllers are displayed in
the virtual world. There is a one to one mapping between the real and
virtual world, hence all movements are observable in real-time from
the real world. The details of which buttons are used for interaction
during password entry can be seen in (C).
example, logging into the user’s account from a different HMD, or
getting hold of the user’s HMD while it is unattended.
2.3.2 Immediate Attack
Shortly after authenticating, the user takes off the HMD and leave it
temporarily unattended e.g., to grab a glass of water from the next
door room. One of the bystanders in the room picks up the headset
and continues with the game. When prompted to authenticate in
order to do an in-app purchase, attacker enters the password they
had just observed.
3 AN EXAMPLE 3D AUTHENTICATION CONCEPT
To test the above mentioned concepts from prior work that would
benefit from the virtual reality setting, we developed an authentica-
tion scheme called RoomLock.
We implemented it using Unity 3D with C#. A HTC Vive con-
troller (Fig. 3) is used for virtual pointing 2.
3.1 Overview
To meet the needs of a knowledge-based authentication concept,
users authenticate by pointing at a pre-defined number of stationary
objects in a virtual room, in a specific order (Fig. 1). In our prototype
and study, a password consists of a list of 4 objects, and a total of 9
objects were available for selection (Fig. 4). The limitless 3D space
in virtual reality, allows both password length and set of objects to
be easily extended. Due to the novelty of the authentication concept
in immersive 3D environments and to limit the time required for
introducing the study to participants, we chose objects based on the
assumption that they are well-known to anyone joining our study,
rather than choosing digital products for smart homes.
3.2 Input Method and Feedback
Object selection requires pointing with a laser and a button press to
avoid unwanted selections of objects placed in the same visual path.
Upon selection of two or more objects, visual feedback in the form
of a blue connecting line appears in the virtual scene. The concept
allows for the same objects to be selected multiple times but not
2Note, at the point of the study, self-contained devices, such as the Oculus
Go [24], were not yet available, thus the study used the HTC Vive but assumes
the interaction without the desktop and keyboard being available.
Figure 4: The first row displays 3D models of the real objects in the
second row. Objects in the first row were used for authentication
in Environmentvirtual whereas the once in the second made up the
password in Environment real.
3
To appear in IEEE VR.
consecutively. Further, the blue connecting line changes its colour
when an authentication attempt is completed, turning green if it was
successful, or red otherwise.
Haptic feedback is included to meet the needs of the previously
proposed password space: The controller vibrates briefly two times
on correct input; and slowly two times on false input.
3.3 Error Handling
Error handling followed pattern entry on smartphones: Users could
not correct individual object selections [10,30], but had to start anew
if they made wanted to change a selection.
3.4 Real versus Virtual World
In order to test the 3D authentication concept in the real world, for
example for smart home purposes, the virtual 3D room used for
RoomLock in our study replicated a real world room at our institute.
The concept and system are flexible and could be easily extended
with different virtual rooms that do not require a RW equivalent.
A physical laser pointer was used for pointing in the real world.
Due to the limitations of the real world, there was no connecting
line between objects upon selection. However, similar to the virtual
version, passwords consisted of 4 real objects from a total of 9
possible options (Fig.4).
4 USER STUDIES
RoomLock was evaluated in three parts: (1) a lab study (N = 48) to
test the usability of RoomLock, and to understand how the interaction
compares to the real world; (2) a follow-up questionnaire (N = 27)
to gain insights into password memorability; and (3) two security
studies (N = 15 and N = 36). Security was solely assessed for the
IVR environment, in two separate lab studies to test the immediate
vs. the posterior threat models (Table 1) for shoulder surfing. All
studies adhered to ethical research standards within our institution.
Table 2: Overview of studies completed as part of the main study in
chronological order.
Type of study Participants
Usability study (RW vs. IVR) N = 48
Memorability study N = 27
Security study I - Post-hoc attack N = 15
Security study II - Immediate attack N = 36
4.1 Variables
Independent and dependent variables are consistent for all studies
evaluating RoomLock. 2.
4.1.1 Independent Variables
Position explores the impact of randomization of the authentication
procedure: either no randomization (Positionbaseline), or varying
users’ starting position (Positionuser), or varying the position of the
objects (Positionobject). In Positionbaseline, users start at a fix point in
the virtual scene. In Positionuser, the starting position is randomized
for every authentication. But in all three conditions the users’ field
of view is always on the starting object (albeit from varying angles.)
Repetition was another variable as participants entered passwords
in each position three times.
Environment differentiates between participants that completed
the study in the real world (Control group: Environmentreal) and
virtual reality (Test group: Environmentvirtual).
4.1.2 Dependent Variables
Entrytime measured the time taken to enter a password. In Envi-
ronmentvirtual the time was tracked from selection of the first object
until the last one. In Environmentreal the end of a password entry was
verbally communicated upon selection of the last object to imitate
the virtual setup.
Error counted the number of times a password was entered in-
correctly. It was tracked by visual inspection in Environmentreal and
automatically in Environmentvirtual.
We also measured cognitive load with a NASA TLX question-
naire [13] and conducted a focus group to capture the perception of
presence in VR [27].
4.2 Usability Study
We used a mixed model design with a between subjects variable
Environment and a within subjects variable position.
4.2.1 Procedure
We recruited 48 participants (14 female) through our University
mailing list. The average age was 23.71 (SD = 3.26). 33% had no
prior experience with VR. Participants were compensated with a 10
EUR voucher for an online shop or institute internal credit.
Passwords were randomly generated from the list of available
objects prior to the start of the study. However, the same set of
passwords was used for each Environment. Each participant entered
each password three times.
Virtual world: Participants were then introduced to the project and
hardware (HTC Vive [22]). They put on the HMD with controllers,
placed in the middle of the virtual room, facing a whiteboard (Fig.1).
This starting position was the same for Environmentreal and Environ-
mentvirtual.
The interaction in the virtual world was introduced by a training
session, which consisted of entering a pre-defined password. This
password appeared on the whiteboard in the virtual room and partic-
ipants were verbally directed by the experimenter on how to enter
it with the HTC Vive controllers. To complete the training session
they had to enter the password three times correctly.
Subsequently, participants completed three different rounds of
password entry with three repetitions each (position x Repetition),
whereby position was counterbalanced. Errors were tracked and
participants had to repeat their entry until they had provided three
correct password repetitions, before moving on to the next condition.
Therefore, each participant entered 9 correct passwords (3 repeti-
tions × 3 repetitions). A NASA TLX questionnaire and one for
demographics concluded the session.
Real world: Participants were given the same introduction to the
project as in Environmentvirtual and started at the same position in
front of the real world whiteboard.
They were instructed on how to use the physical laser pointer
and asked to complete a training session by correctly entering a
pre-defined password three times. The password was provided on
the real whiteboard.
As there was no feedback available from the physical laser pointer,
we asked participants to count out loud whenever they chose an
object with the laser pointer. Similarly, they were asked to say
“finished” at the end of their entry. This allowed us to track errors
and check that the correct objects were selected in the correct order.
The whole procedure was demonstrated prior to starting the study.
The study was completed as in the virtual world: Participants
entered given passwords for all three conditions of position with
three repetitions. Finally, they completed the NASA TLX and demo-
graphics questionnaires.
4.2.2 Results
Entry Time in VR: We confirmed that our data was normally dis-
tributed within the two different environments by visual inspection
of the normal distribution curve for both. There were no outliers.
Mauchlys Test of Sphericity did not indicate that it had been vi-
olated. A repeated measures ANOVA determined that position
had a significant effect on entry time (F2,40 = 14.44, p < 0.05).
Post-hoc analysis showed a significantly higher entry time in Po-
sitionobject(Mean = 14.33, SD = 0.83) compared to the other two
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Figure 5: A significantly higher entry time in Positionobject was found
compared to the other two position conditions, namely Positionbaseline
and Positionuser.
position conditions (Positionbaseline(Mean= 8.58, SD= 1.24) and
Positionuser(Mean= 9.4, SD= 0.71)) (Fig. 5).
Results showed that entry time differed significantly depending
on Repetition(F1.6,36.5 = 7.94, p< 0.05) for all position. Post-hoc
analysis revealed that the first round (Mean= 12.71, SD= 1.1) was
significantly slower (p< 0.05) than in the second (Mean= 10.21,
SD= 0.73) or third (Mean= 9.39, SD= 0.64) try.
However, a closer look at Repetition for each individual po-
sition(F3.45,79.37 = 2.9, p < 0.05) revealed that participants only
showed a positive learning curve for Positionbaseline and Positionuser,
on average they were 43% slower in round 1 and 2 than 3. In contrast,
participants in Positionobject showed no learning effect.
Error per Entry in VR: We also logged error, which is a binary
value that captured whether users entered a correct (true) or incorrect
(false) password. Only 2 errors occurred in 72 entries.
Subjective Feedback in VR: Based on additional questions asked
at the end of the usability study, we found that the connecting line
(Fig.1) was not perceived to be distracting (Median=2, 1=”not dis-
tracting at all”) confirm this.
Participants were asked to speak out loud if they had feedback
after every password entry. This qualitative feedback revealed that
participants perceived the interactions to be intuitive. Moreover,
42% remarked that objects which were not in their FOV, especially
the once on the ground or close to the ceiling, were harder to find.
Comparison VR and Real World: The between subjects analysis
with a Shapiro-Wilk test on Environment revealed that our data was
not normally distributed (p< 0.05). A Mann-Whitney test indicated
that the entry time was greater in Environmentvirtual (Mean = 10.77s)
than in Environmentreal (Mean = 6.97s, U = 14145, (p < 0.05)).
When comparing the paired conditions between both variables, all
pairs show a significant (p < 0.05) higher entry time in Environ-
mentvirtual than in Environmentreal (Table3).
There were five errors out of 144 password entries. Two occurred
in Environmentvirtual and three in Environmentreal. One error in En-
vironmentreal was out of frustration, as the participant could not find
an object hence a wrong password was forcefully entered. Three
of the remaining errors were due to incorrect order entries. One
participant inEnvironmentvirtual mistook the spray bottle for the wa-
ter, which shares a similar colour scheme (Fig.4). According to the
conducted Sign Test no significant (p> 0.05) difference was found
in the NASA-TLX scores between both world conditions.
4.3 Memorability Study
To gain insights into how memorable our passwords were, we asked
participants from our usability study to complete a follow-up ques-
tionnaire one week after the first study (resulting in N = 27, female
= 12 ). Participants were not informed about the nature of the follow
up questionnaire, indicating that there was no memorability bias. As
Table 3: A Mann-Whitney test indicated that the entry time was greater
in Environmentvirtual than in Environment real.
Position Mean RW Mean VR U p
Baseline1 7.57s 11.79s 176 0.021
Baseline2 5.47s 7.57s 182 0.029
Baseline3 4.84s 6.39s 154 0.006
User1 7.17s 12.15s 156 0.006
User2 5.4s 8.8s 136 0.002
User3 5.26s 7.25s 151 0.005
Object1 9.74s 14.19s 137 0.002
Object2 8.42s 14.27s 117 0.001
Object3 8.87s 14.53s 117 0.001
compensation, they took part in a raffle for a 10 EUR online shop
voucher.
11 participants from Environmentvirtual and 16 from Environ-
mentreal completed the questionnaire.
4.3.1 Procedure
The questionnaire consisted of three parts: Firstly, participants were
asked to remember their passwords and to enter the names of the
four objects in the right order without any cues. Secondly, they
were provided with the 9 possible options (Fig.4) and given the
opportunity to change their initial entry or to confirm the input.
Finally, they had to create their own password out of the available
objects, to investigate what type of passwords they would create
based on their experience so far.
4.3.2 Results
The results of the memorability study (N = 27) indicate that Room-
Lock passwords are memorable, especially with cued-recall. One
participant had to be excluded as their results clearly indicated that
they did not read the instructions. Results are ordered by cued versus
non-cued recall. The questionnaire was organized in the same order.
Non-cued recall: Twentyone participants memorized their pass-
words 100% correctly. Four participants failed to remember their
passwords one week after completing the usability study. Three
of these participants had the majority of objects correct but not in
the correct order and only one participant failed to remember any
objects. Another two remembered the password with only one object
each not being in the correct order.
Cued recall: One participant changed their input after the images
were displayed, which resulted in an incorrect entry as the initial
password was correct. Another participant that had given a wrong
password in the first non-cued recall round, changed their passwords
to the correct one. They changed their input from ’something green’
to the ’plant’ object (Fig. 4). Thus, after the cue-recall round, there
were still twentyone participants who memorized their passwords
correctly.
Observations on Memory Techniques and Password Choices: Based
on additional questions that we asked at the end of the questionnaire
we made the following observations: (1) Without nudging partic-
ipants to use specific memory techniques, they naturally used the
link technique [12]. Overall passwords showed the tendency to tell
a story, such that the choice of ’chips’ and ’water’ objects can be
interpreted as ’I am eating chips, I am thirsty.’. (2) None of the
participants chose duplicate objects in their own passwords.
4.4 Security Study I - Post-hoc Attack
We recruited 15 Participants (7 female) based on their participation
in the usability study (N = 7) and from a university mailing list
(N = 8). Their average age was 23.13 (SD=3.58). Participants were
asked to provide their experience with VR on a likert scale (5=no
5
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experience), the median was 4. Participants were rewarded with a 5
EUR voucher for an online shop or an institute internal credit.
4.4.1 Procedure
Participants answered a demographics questionnaire. Then they
were provided with a sheet of paper that showed multiple printed
images of the 3D room.
We randomly chose three people recorded in the usability study
in condition Positionbaseline. Each of these recordings was used for
an “attack” in the following three steps:
First, participants watched the video that showed the interaction
viewed from the real world, from the best possible angle for a video
attacker. The angle was the result of a trial and error validation by
the experimenters and showed the victims gestures from the view
point of someone hovering over and slightly to the left of the victim
(e.g. drone) . They could re-watch it as many times as they wanted.
They then watched a video of the virtual scene, to help them
understand where objects were placed in the virtual room.
In the third round participants were allowed to re-watch both
videos from the first two rounds.
After each of these three rounds, participants used the printout of
the 3D room to indicate their guess of the pointing locations of the
observed user. In addition, they provided a Likert-scale rating on
perceived difficulty.
Our plan was to repeat the the above mentioned procedure for
all conditions of our independent variable position. However, after
the first iterations, participants were demotivated and started giving
random guesses to complete the study. They commented that it was
too difficult to guess the passwords in Positionbaseline and did not
see any value in trying for Positionuser and Positionobject.
4.4.2 Results
Taking the best guess from all three rounds into consideration, in
Positionbaseline, without changing user and object position, the video
attackers were overall not able to guess the password correctly: One
participant was able to identify two objects of the attacked password
but not in the correct order and one participants guessed two objects
in the correct order. Half of the participants were able to guess one
object without being able to put it in the correct order.
When changing Positionobject and Positionuser, the video attackers
were not able to provide a guess. The qualitative feedback revealed
that they found it impossible to imagine themselves in the correct
position in the virtual scene: (P3) ”I have no idea in which direction
she is looking at now.” (P7) ”Do I have to provide a guess? I have
no clue but I can pick random points in the scene and hope that I am
lucky.” (P13) ”Can you help me out by telling me what view of the
room she has right now?”
The experimenter also observed that 2 attackers tried to observe
the head movements of the victim in order to guess the password.
(P3) ”It would be great to see where they are looking at (...) maybe I
can just look at the head (...) don’t think that is really helpful either.”
4.5 Security Study II - Immediate Attack
We recruited 36 participants for a within-subjects lab study from our
institution (N = 25) and random selection on the street (N = 11).
They had an average age of 26.16 (SD=7.22, 15 female).
4.5.1 Procedure
The study started with an introduction, which was concluded by
signing the consent form. Subsequently, they completed a demo-
graphics questionnaire and were introduced to the hardware. They
were asked to do a training round in IVR to familiarize themselves
with the hardware and RoomLock. Training was deemed successful
once they entered a pre-defined password correctly three times in
a row. For the main part of the study participants had to act as
attackers in the real world whilst observing an expert user entering
passwords in RoomLock.
To test the effect of a position change, the first password was
entered in Positionbaseline, the second and third from two random
Positionuser. (Due to the negative feedback for Positionobject in
the usability and posterior security study, it was not included as a
variable.) Thus participants observed three pre-defined passwords
and after each observation, up to three guessing trials were possible.
to simulate a prepared attack, the attacker was provided with a
pen and paper and encouraged to (1) draw the virtual room and (2)
take notes during observation. They were also told the start and end
of the authentication gesture. After each attack, participants had to
rate the difficulty of observation. Finally, they were asked to put on
the headset again in order to set their own password of choice. The
study was concluded by a semi structured questionnaire. Participants
were rewarded with an Amazon voucher worth 7.50 EUR.
4.5.2 Results
Overall, in contrast to the post-hoc attacks (0% success rate), this
study showed that immediate attacks are more successful (12.5%
success rate).
Visual inspection confirmed that all data was normally distributed.
Binary results highlighted that after the first attack in Positionbaseline
18.5% of the passwords were guessed correctly and only 19.4%
were not guessed at all. Randomizing user position within the virtual
room led to a shoulder surfing rate of 12.5% after the second attack.
A one-way ANOVA (F2,105 = 5.3, p < 0.05) revealed a signifi-
cant effect depending on changes in Positionuser on attack success.
This was supported by the results from the semi structured question-
naire, where 31% stated that changing position made observation
more difficult. An additional 19.45% noted that closeness of virtual
objects increased observation difficulty.
In regard to observation tactics, 35 participants took notes,
whereby 28 drew a 2D model of the virtual room with the pen and
paper that were provided (Fig.6). Further analysis of the drawings
revealed that virtual objects were represented in form of numbers
(71.4%) or names (68.6%) and the order was noted with arrows
(57.1%).
The security study was completed by asking participants to set
their own passwords within RoomLock. The analysis revealed that
two objects (banana and plant) which were placed on a table close
to each other, rather than the floor or wall, were chosen 38% of
the time. Similarly, we found that object proximity and placement
within the same FOV also influenced individual password setup.
48% of participants chose to repeat a maximum of 2 objects - not
consecutively - and the average length was 6.5. All participants
changed their FOV at least once to select objects during password
setup.
4.6 Limitations
The lack of feedback in the real world during pointing made it
difficult to create the exact same experience in both worlds. In
the real world the laser is only visible on the hit object, rather
than continuously as in virtual reality. Moreover, there was no
confirm button on the real world laser pointer. Nonetheless, it can be
argued that these inconsistencies between the worlds did not affect
the authentication experience, as results revealed the real world
interaction to be more usable despite the lack of feedback.
Training effects were not tested as part of our study but they were
already visible during the repetitions in our usability study. Thus,
we believe future work, for example in form of a long lasting field
study, will reveal further improvements to entry time.
We used a university mailing list for recruitment – our sample
thus only reflects a certain demographic. Students are believed
to be more technology-savvy compared to the general population.
However this is one of the main target groups for this concept.
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Figure 6: Four samples of participants’ notes, which were taken during
the security study investigating the immediate threat of RoomLock.
The majority of participants drew a top view of the virtual room.
5 DISCUSSION
We adapted prior concepts from authentication research that are
promising for interaction in a real and virtual immersive 3D environ-
ment and investigated their usability, memorabilty and security. In
addtion, we evaluated the transferrability of findings between IVR
and RW and compared the results.
5.1 Leveraging the Third Dimension
5.1.1 Object Placement affects Entry Times
Placement and size of objects affects entry times, as we observed
that objects placed in the center of the FOV were found quicker than
ones at the edges. This confirms previous results by Arthur et al. [1],
who evaluated the perception of spatial layouts in VR.
5.1.2 User Preferences during Password Setup
During password setup users preferred objects that were close to
each other, which is also advantageous from a security perspective,
as close proximity decreases susceptibility to shoulder surfing. Ad-
ditionally, the majority of users changed their FOV at least once to
find and select more objects within the virtual room which increases
the practical password space which in turn improves security.
5.1.3 Password Space and Representation
The design of our concept is closely aligned with the authentication
concept of patterns [30], as RoomLock passwords can, most straight-
forwardly, be defined as a list of object identifiers. However, they
could also be described as gestures, via the lines drawn between
objects. Moreover, we could use a list of object coordinates (x, y, z).
Although, there are similarities to patterns, the third dimension adds
another level of complexity, which results in an increased password
space. In this initial investigation, we designed the password to have
a total length of 4 objects, however, to increase the the password
space [31] this should and can be easily extended.
It would be interesting to observe participants’ behaviour regard-
ing password creation in a 3D environment and whether differences
exist compared to 2D pattern creation. Password creation in the third
dimension might inspire additional concepts (e.g. users memorise
object locations instead of specific objects), and might increase the
(theoretical) password space. A closer treatment is beyond the scope
of this paper, yet presents an interesting direction for future research.
5.1.4 Single vs. Shared Usage
We believe RoomLock has the potential also to act as a group au-
thentication scheme by leveraging the notion of shared rooms and
objects. Das et al. [6] highlight the need for socially-inclusive group
authentication to access shared resources (e.g. equipment such as
commonly used HMDs), instead of using individual secrets which
may be perceived as ’rude or inappropriate’.
From our point of view the future vision for HMDs is that they
are accessible both as single- and multi-user devices, similar to the
usage pattern for tablet devices or apps, such as Netflix. The concept
of shared authentication allows for example parents to restrict certain
content from their children or companies to enable shared access to
specific content.
In the first example, a common room, such as the family living
room may be the room in which the objects are placed. The objects
itself could be chosen by all family members who may need access,
whereby the children use a subset of the objects enabling the unique
identification of individual users whilst still maintaining a shared
password. Although the concept of RoomLock allows this extension,
further studies need to evaluate whether users perceive this to be
usable when tested in a group context.
5.1.5 Improving Usability through the Third Dimension
At first glance, our results indicate that users take longer to complete
a 4-object password in the third dimension - compared to 2D pass-
word in IVR [10] or 2D patterns in the real world [30]. However,
the repetition data highlights that they were nearly twice as quick in
the third round, even when changing user position, which implies
a steep learning curve for authentication in 3D. Additionaly, error
rates are lower than 2D real world results [30]. To summarize, our
data suggests that usability in 3D is comparable to established au-
thentication systems, however, further studies over longer periods of
time, will have to confirm whether entry times can be improved.
5.2 Using the Virtual World to Aid Memorability
5.2.1 RoomLock Passwords are Memorable
Our memorability study indicates that RoomLock’s passwords are
well remembered. After one week, the majority of participants
remembered their objects without wearing an HMD and being im-
mersed in the virtual room.
5.2.2 Personalisation Opportunities
The opportunity to increase memorability through personalisation
RoomLock is a key strength of our concept and presents an avenue for
future work: We believe that the entry time can be further optimized
through habituation as well as by personalizing RoomLock. Users
could not only create their own individual passwords by choosing
personal objects but also authenticate in familiar rooms (e.g a 3D
model of their living room), rather than the one we tested in our
study. Similarly, these objects may be adjusted to suit the use case.
For example, smart home authentication may be tested better with
digital objects, such as smart speakers.
5.3 Randomization to Increase Security
5.3.1 Third Dimension Decreases Shoulder Surfing Risk
The security study highlighted the value of seamless authentication
in VR: Leveraging the third dimension for password entry drastically
decreases the risk of shoulder surfing, compared to 2D authentication
in VR (compare to [10]).
5.3.2 Third Dimension Hinders Immediate Attacks
The study on the immediate threat model investigated whether by-
standers are able to attack the victim in real-time when entering
the same virtual room. This may be the case with shared devices,
where bystanders use the same HMD after the victim has taken it
off. Shoulder surfing was proven to be less successful in our 3D
concept Roomlock (12.5%) compared to previous 2D VR authentica-
tion studies by George et al. [10] (18%). Even without randomizing
user position, whereby user’s starting position is changed for each
password entry, binary attacking success was comparable (18.5%).
7
To appear in IEEE VR.
5.3.3 Post-hoc Attacks Unsuccessful even without Randomi-
sation
In the posterior threat model, even without randomising user and
object positions, video attackers were not able to guess the passwords
correctly. Since we thus reached “perfect” security for our tasks
already in the baseline, we could not confirm whether changing user
and object position increases security even further. But the usability
study revealed that changing user position is as usable as keeping it
constant, whilst changing objects was found to be cumbersome.
5.3.4 Methodology: Multiple Threat Models for IVR Auth.
Comparing both attack studies, immediate attacks were much more
successful than post-hoc attacks. From a methodological perspective,
this finding sheds light on the importance of testing VR authentica-
tion concepts for multiple threat models. Our findings suggest that
the difference in shoulder surfing rate between posterior vs immedi-
ate threat is due to attackers having experienced RoomLock in IVR
for the latter. This enabled them to form a more sophisticated mental
model of the virtual room, which is confirmed by the drawings they
made during the security study testing the immediate threat model.
Another interesting finding was the use of head movements as
gestures that reveal additional information about the virtual interac-
tions [16]. This idea was raised by the attackers during the security
study rather than the users of RoomLock. Future attack studies could
thus focus on head movements to infer the placement of objects
within the virtual room.
5.4 Design Recommendations for RoomLock
Based on our results and discussion, we summarize the following
recommendations:
(a) Objects should be placed in the FOV of the user and close to
each other to decrease input times and increase security.
(b) Leveraging depth in 3D environments provides similar security
and usability as established authentication schemes, but user ran-
domization drastically improves security without reducing usability.
(c) To maintain similar entry times to prior work, use 4 out of 9
objects to make up the 3D password.
(d) Objects should be familiar to the user and it should be possible
to create a story with them to support memorability of passwords.
5.5 IVR as a Testbed for Usable Security Research
5.5.1 Transferability between RW and VR
Although, there were differences with regards to entry times, we
found no significant differences in workload between the real and
virtual world for RoomLock. This suggests that users’ perception
of difficulty is not influenced by the environment, whereas their
performance is.
We argue that the workload similarities are due to the intuitiveness
of interactions in RoomLock. This is supported by the qualitative
feedback provided by participants during the usability study, which
revealed that the interactions were perceived to be natural without
needing further training. Prior work refers to this phenomenon as the
theory of intuitive interactions, which also states that it will improve
in usability over time [7].
Although, entry times were different in both environments, we
argue that the advantages that IVR as a testbed for real world smart
home authentication concepts offers, outweighs this difference. In
addition to the points mentioned above, the study setup and proce-
dure took drastically longer for the real world than IVR and consid-
ering time for completion is a main factor of rapid prototyping, we
believe IVR to be a valid testbed for authentication concepts.
5.5.2 Alternative Approaches for Smart Home Authentication
There are two approaches to transfer our findings to a working
prototype for smart home authentication based on RoomLock: Firstly,
the system could be built in such a way that only smart objects are
used to create passwords, such as speakers or voice assistants. These
systems would need to be extended with a solution to recognize
users’ pointing interactions (e.g. camera) and the user would need
to be equipped with a pointing device (e.g. mobile phone and RFID
or beacon technology) to activate these objects as passwords. Based
on our findings and prior work [10], we recommend pointing rather
than a touch solution, as the latter was found to be less time efficient.
A second approach may be to track the whole room and all user
interactions via a real-time video recognition system, similar to the
virtual reality solution for RoomLock, which would allow for all
objects within that room to be used for passwords. Although this
may provide a broader password space, it is also less favourable from
a usable security perspective due to the additional amount of data
that is being tracked and the continuity of such a tracking system.
5.5.3 Methodology: Comparing Interactions in RW and VR
These findings show that measuring workload is an important part
of the methodology of investigating usable security interaction in
3D environments. Differences in workload arguably lead to an inten-
sified focus on the main task (e.g. authentication), whilst neglecting
necessary secondary tasks (e.g. awareness of surroundings) [33] and
therefore ignoring possible ongoing shoulder surfing attacks. This
needs further exploration as optimizing the design for cognitive load
is an important feature in 3D authentication schemes.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented RoomLock, an authentication scheme
specifically designed for authentication in the third dimension. It
exploits the virtual 3D space, allowing users to select objects in
a virtual room to create a 3D graphical password. RoomLock is
based on analysis of prior work and features that are relevant to
authentication in 3D.
Results from a usability and security study indicate that Room-
Lock is comparably usable and memorable, however the key strength
lies in its high level of security. In our post-hoc threat model, we
found no risk to shoulder surfing attacks and the immediate threat
model revealed an attack rate of 12.5%. Regarding transferability
between the two environments, we found that although, interactions
took significantly longer in the virtual world compared to the real
world, there were no differences in workload, which implies that
users’ perception of difficulty is not influenced by the environment,
whereas performance is.
An obvious next step would be to investigate additional param-
eters for RoomLock, such as object size, length of password, and
effect of personalized objects on memorability and entry time.
Future work may also review whether the findings are applicable
to a MR (Mixed Reality) and AR (Augmented Reality) device, such
as the Holo Lens [9]. From a technical and user experience point of
view, RoomLock can be adapted without changes; the only difference
being the interaction with the hands as pointers rather than with the
controllers. However based on our findings there may be differences
in workload due to the parallel view of the real and virtual world.
Arguably, shoulder surfing risk should decrease, as the victim has a
view of the real world compared to the VR experience.
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